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The Antecedents of Simultaneous Appointments to CEO and Chair

In relay succession, boards add the Chair title to successful CEOs, creating
duality. Sometimes boards by-pass relay succession and appoint an individual directly
into the dual position. We propose that this will occur when there is the need for an
unambiguous leader and when the appointee has greater bargaining power. We show that
following the firing of the predecessor, when the successor is an outsider, and when the
successor is not the designated heir, the incidence of simultaneous dual appointments
increases. We also find that executives appointed into the dual positions are older than
those appointed only as a CEO.
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The Antecedents of Simultaneous Appointments to CEO and Chair
CEO/Chair duality occurs when one individual holds both leadership positions.
This leadership structure has received considerable scrutiny from investor groups (e.g.,
Investor Responsibility Research Center) and pension plans such as the California
Employee Retirement System and the New York City Pension Fund. These groups
generally recommend that the CEO position be separated from the board chair position.
Leading academic researchers have also recommended separation of the two jobs
(Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). The problem with duality, as argued by its
critics, is that the board of directors is charged with monitoring manager performance. If
the top manager is also the Chair of the board, critics argue that board monitoring of
managers will be compromised. The interest in duality is presumably based on the idea
that it would lead to worse financial performance through increased agency costs than
when the CEO title and Chair title are not invested in one individual. That is, by
reducing board independence and by possibly biasing senior managers’ performance
appraisals, the firm with a dual leadership structure would not be able to perform as well
as one with an independent board Chair.
This agency theory perspective motivates much of the criticism that has been
placed on the dual governance structure. The arguments center around the idea that
duality can lead to a potential abuse of power (Hambrick, 1991; Jensen, 1993). Kesner
and Dalton (1986) maintain that duality in a corporation would be the same as one person
simultaneously occupying the U.S. Presidency and the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. Calls for separation of the two positions have come from many sources (e.g.
Dobrzynski, 1991; Levy, 1981; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Monks and Minow, 1991).
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Pension funds, mutual funds and other institutional investors have voiced discontent with
companies that have one person in the CEO and Chair position.
There is an alternative perspective on duality and it is based on stewardship
theory. Here, there are no fundamental problems with managerial motivation; instead
managers want to perform well and be good stewards of the corporation’s assets on
behalf of shareholders (Donaldson, 1990a, 1990b; Barney, 1990). Under stewardship
theory duality may enable a manager to attain superior performance by giving that person
complete authority (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). With a dual governance structure there
would be no doubt about who is in control. “The organization will enjoy the classic
benefits of unity of direction and of strong command and control” (Donaldson & Davis,
p. 52).
Despite the public attention and recommendations, the dual leadership structure
has remained one of the dominant management configurations in the United States and
elsewhere. The dual leadership structure has been extensively studied, and with few
exceptions researchers have not found its purported costs to outweigh its benefits (e.g.
Berg and Smith, 1978; Chaganti et al., 1985; Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993; Daily, 1995;
Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997; Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993, 1997; Dalton, Daily,
Ellstrand, and Johnson, 1998; Rechner and Dalton, 1989, 1991; Harris and Helfat, 1998;
Faleye, 2007). Its benefits include the establishment of an unambiguous leader. That is,
when one person is both CEO and Chair, there is no question in the market place or in the
firm about who is in charge.
Duality often occurs in the relay succession process. In relay successions, boards
add the Chair title to successful CEOs, creating duality. Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell
(1997) find that this relay process is very common in U.S. firms. Sometimes boards by4

pass relay succession and appoint an individual directly into the dual position. This
succession pattern has received considerably less attention from researchers. The
purpose of this study is to investigate the motivations behind the decision to appoint an
individual that is neither CEO nor Chair into the dual position. Therefore, we focus on
those CEO successions when the standard relay process is not being followed. We
propose that this will occur when there is the need for an unambiguous leader and when
the appointee has greater bargaining power.
The board of directors has the responsibility to hire, fire, and promote senior
managers (Mace, 1971). Ocasio (1999) argues that boards like to follow succession rules
when making decisions. Some succession rules are not written, but are instead informal
rules that guide behavior (Huse, 2000; Mace, 1971). By following these informal
succession rules, boards can lessen internal strife and provide the impression that they are
meeting their fiduciary responsibilities. The most common set of succession rules, relay
succession or passing the baton, has been outlined by Vancil (1987), with updated
analysis provided by Ocasio (1999), Cannella and Shen (2001, 2002a, 2002b), Harris and
Helfat, (1998), and Daily and Dalton (1995, 1997). Following this set of succession
rules, duality occurs as a natural step as the board promotes a senior executive. In relay
succession, the board adds the Chair title to a successful CEO. In other words, time spent
as CEO is like an apprenticeship prior to the board investing both titles in one person.
Sometimes, however, a board makes a dual appointment of an executive as CEO
and as Chair at the same time. While the board may be following a different set of
succession rules, we suggest that this is not relay succession as it has been previously
defined (Vancil, 1987).

We hypothesize that boards will promote an executive directly

into the dual titles when there has been stress on the firms such as poor performance or
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following the firing of the predecessor. Here, there may be a need for strong and clear
leadership. Therefore, we test if dual appointments are more likely when there has been
poor prior performance, when the predecessor has been fired, when the successor is not
the designated heir, and when the successor is an outsider. We also argue that boards will
be more likely to promote an executive simultaneously as CEO and Chair when the
executive is more experienced. Each of these predictions would be consistent with
duality being used optimally by the firm’s board.
Our results are consistent with duality being used to provide strong and clear
leadership. Our findings do not support a relation between poor performance (as
measured by the industry-adjusted return on assets) and duality. We find that
simultaneous appointments to CEO and Chair are more likely to occur when the
predecessor has been fired, when the CEO is an outsider, when the CEO has not been the
heir apparent, and when the CEO is somewhat older. Prior performance is not
significantly related to the likelihood that a firm will make a dual appointment, and dual
appointments do not have power to predict the short term performance of the firm.

DUALITY
Relay Succession and Duality
Relay succession is perhaps the most common set of succession practices
(Fortune, 1988). In relay succession, duality is a normal part of the succession planning
process for senior executives. Vancil (1987) describes relay succession as a process in
which a company grooms an heir-apparent and promotes the heir into positions of
increasing authority in the company hierarchy. In relay succession, the board of directors
appoints the president or COO as the heir to the CEO. After a suitable probationary
6

period and when the need for a new CEO occurs, the board appoints the heir to be the
new CEO. This probationary period is not fixed and may be highly variable across
companies. For example, Cannella and Shen (2001) find that tenure in the heir position
averages 4.5 years but has a standard deviation of nearly 3.7 years. After an additional
probationary period, the board adds the chair title to the CEO. Thus, duality is simply
one step in the progression of authority within a company. As the relay process is
continuous, the CEO/chair relinquishes the president title and gives it to the new heir.
When the new heir is ready, (s)he becomes the new CEO while the former CEO retains
the chair position. Here the two positions are separate again until the Chair relinquishes
this title.
There are other ways in which duality occurs as a progression. For example,
some companies utilize the horse race, which is examined by Ocasio (1999) and Cannella
and Shen (2001). Here, several executives actively compete for the CEO spot. The
winner of the horse race receives promotion to CEO. Later, this CEO may become board
chair as well. As in relay succession, when there is a horse race the chair position does
not necessarily go to the successor CEO at the time of appointment to CEO. In both relay
succession and the horse race, successor CEOs move up through the internal ranks to the
CEO position and only later become both CEO and chair.
Companies often choose not to appoint an internal candidate when the situation
calls for change. For example, when prior firm performance has been poor (Kesner &
Sebora, 1994; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993) or when the prior CEO has been fired
(Borokhovich, Parrino & Trapani, 1996) companies will be more likely to hire an
outsider as the successor CEO1. In these instances, there is an apparent need to bypass
the internal succession process.
7

The same type of situations that persuade boards to by-pass internal succession
may also create the need for an unambiguous leader. By appointing a dual successor,
they send a signal to the external market place (and perhaps to employees in the
company) that one person is in charge. The signal implies that there is one leader who
has the authority to address the situation. When there has been a problem such as poor
performance and/or the firing of a CEO, companies may forgo internal succession
progression and appoint one leader simultaneously as CEO and chair. For example,
Davidson, Tong, Worrell, and Rowe (2004) find that when a CEO becomes injured or too
ill to continue, boards often replace the CEO with the board chair, creating a dual leader.
Agency Perspective on Duality
One position on duality is based on agency theory. Agency theory examines the
consequences arising from the fact that owners contract with managers to run the firm.
The manager becomes responsible for the day-to-day operations of the firm and for
maximizing the utility of the owners. Agency theory rests on the idea that owners and
managers of large firms pursue their own personal utility maximization. As a result,
decisions made by managers may not always coincide with maximizing owner utility.
The costs to owners of lost utility are agency costs.
Owners recognize the potential for agency costs and construct various
mechanisms to monitor and control managers. Among these mechanisms is the board of
directors. The board is charged with keeping potentially self-serving managers under
control by, for example, overseeing major strategic decisions, designing pay packages for
managers, and monitoring manager performance.
Some agency theorists argue that the dual governance structure allows managers
to undermine board power (Jensen, 1993). Under a dual governance structure, the lead
8

manager is the CEO, and this person is also the head of the group that monitors and
rewards performance. An analogy would be to allow students to assign their grade in a
college class when their ability to attain post-graduation employment rests heavily on the
grade they receive.
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that the dual governance structure
could lead to increased agency costs. For example, Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim, and Nemec
(2004) find that income-increasing earnings management is greater under newlyappointed dual leaders than when the newly appointed leader is only a CEO. Mallette
and Fowler (1992) find the adoption of poison pills (which can reduce the likelihood of a
merger) is more likely under dual leadership, and McWilliams and Sen (1997) show
greater negative abnormal returns occur following anti-takeover amendments when there
is dual leadership. Furthermore, dual leadership seems to entrench CEOs by reducing the
likelihood of their being fired (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993).
An Alternative Perspective
Donaldson and Davis (1991) suggest that CEO’s can best accomplish their
financial goals when they are given sufficient authority2. For the CEO, this would mean
being named to the additional position of board chair. Placing one executive in the dual
position would thereby promote shareholder wealth maximization.
How would the CEO/chair further shareholder wealth maximization? Finkelstein
and D’Aveni (1994) cite early work supporting duality. For example, duality provides
unity of command (Fayol, 1949), a leader with clear and unambiguous authority (Massie,
1965), and lessens confusion and conflict among top managers that report to a single
leader (Galbraith, 1977). Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) also cite works in
administrative theory concluding that a strong leader will be better able to set strategic
9

direction and take decisive action (Barnard, 1938; Chandler, 1962; Andrews, 1971;
Miller & Friesen, 1977). Boards may choose a dual leader so that it is clear to
stakeholders that one person is in charge.
In contrast to the perspective from agency theory, duality would not harm
shareholders. Instead, duality would further shareholder interests.
A Synthesis of Conflicting Perspectives
The alternative perspectives on duality are seemingly at odds. Agency theorists
would argue that duality should be counter to shareholder wealth maximization as
shareholders and managers pursue utility maximization with different objectives in mind.
On the other hand, one could also argue that the CEO/chair with sufficient authority
would be better able to maximize both their own and shareholders’ utility. The
differences in the two views seem to be irreconcilable.
There is another interpretation. Perhaps both views are at least partially correct.
That is, there could be agency costs associated with duality and simultaneously be
benefits. So when an executive is placed in a dual role, there are both costs and benefits
to shareholders (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997). In some cases the costs may outweigh
the benefits and in others, the benefits outweigh the costs. Presumably, a board would
only install a dual leader when they perceive the benefits of the dual governance structure
are greater than the perceived costs.
There is empirical evidence that supports this position. Some results show the
potential for agency costs in duality situations (e.g. Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim & Nemec,
2004; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; McWilliams & Sen, 1997; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993).
However, studies examining the impact of duality on performance have generally found
that duality does not impact overall performance (e.g. Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1997;
10

Daily & Dalton, 1997; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998).

Since there appears

to be the potential for agency costs under a dual regime, but the overall effect of duality
appears to be neutral, it suggests that there are benefits that offset the costs.
HYPOTHESES
We propose that the decision to simultaneously appoint a single person as CEO
and chair will more likely occur following situations or contingencies that create stress on
the company. These situations include things such as poor prior performance, the firing
of the predecessor CEO, the hiring of an outsider as the successor CEO, and the decision
to promote someone other than the heir-apparent. Similarly, boards may feel more
comfortable hiring or promoting a dual leader who is older, with more experience. We,
therefore, develop hypotheses concerning these situations below.
Duality and Poor Prior Performance
Poor prior performance may create a need for change at the top in a corporation
(Kesner & Sebora, 1994). Poor performance can be measured by numerous things.
Generally, poor performance refers to below average profitability or below average stock
market performance of a firm. There is considerable research suggesting that turnover
rates are influenced by prior performance (e.g. Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Furtado &
Rozeff, 1987; Warner, Watts & Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Denis & Denis, 1995;
Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; Parrino, 1997). The relation between poor performance and
turnover, however, may be mitigated by duality. Goyal and Park (2002) find that
turnover rates are lower following poor performance when there is a dual leadership
structure than when there is not.
That turnover is influenced by prior performance seems clear. However, if we
separate the turnover decision (predecessor chooses to leave the firm, leave the CEO
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position, or is fired) from the succession decision (the choice of the new CEO), prior
performance may also influence successor choice. There is some empirical evidence to
support this conclusion. For example, poor prior performance and turnover is often
followed by the hiring of an outside successor (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993), and relay
succession is more likely to occur when performance has been good (Cannella & Shen,
2001).
Poor prior performance may influence the succession decision in other ways as
well. For example, poor performance may also create the need or the board’s perception
of the need to have a clear and unambiguous leader. The unambiguous leader that is both
CEO and chair would have greater authority and, perhaps, have a better chance of
implementing a plan to turn performance around. We believe that following poor
performance and CEO turnover, a board may be more likely to appoint a dual executive.
Thus, poor performance will be a contingency that encourages boards not to follow the
normal succession progression and to immediately establish a clear leader, a dual
CEO/chair. We, therefore, hypothesize:
H1: When prior performance has been poor, boards will be more likely to
simultaneously appoint a CEO successor who is also the chair of the board.

Firing the Predecessor
Ocasio (1999) suggests that the normal succession rules are more likely to be
followed when the predecessor has retired. Empirical research has generally supported
this contention (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). When the board
fires a CEO, a power vacuum has been created. The sudden change at the top can create
confusion not only inside the organization but also to outside constituents. Here, there
may be a need or perceived need for an unambiguous leader. The board may believe that
12

to create the appearance of unified command in the wake of the firing decision that there
needs to be one leader. In addition, following the firing of a CEO, there may appear to be
a power vacuum in the company. By appointing an undisputed leader, one that is both
CEO and Chair, the perceptions of a power vacuum may be somewhat alleviated. We
expect that subsequent to firing a CEO, that the board will be more likely to bestow the
successor with both titles, CEO and Chair, than if the predecessor was not fired.
We, therefore, hypothesize:
H2: When the predecessor CEO has been fired, boards will be more likely to
simultaneously appoint a CEO successor who is also the chair of the board
than when the predecessor is not fired.

Heir-Apparent
Under relay-succession, companies groom heir apparent executives by giving
them the title of President and/or Chief Operating Officer. After a training and
probationary period and when the need arises, the board appoints the designated heir into
the CEO position. The former CEO becomes Chair of the board. Finally, the new CEO
is also given the title of board Chair, and for a period of time one person is both the Chair
and the CEO. A new heir-apparent is now found in the President or COO position.
Eventually, the CEO title is relinquished to the new heir-apparent and the process begins
again. The interaction of these positions during the succession process and its
implication for the status of duality is touched on by Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997)
and is examined in detail by Worrell, Nemec, and Davidson (1997), Cannella and
Lubatkin (1993), and Harris and Helfat (1998).
Duality may also occur in situations other than relay successions. In these cases,
the board places one individual directly into the two positions. Here, the successor may
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not have served in one of the heir apparent designations. Boards may make these
appointments when they do not believe the original heir-apparent is adequate for the job,
when a designated heir was never appointed, or when the board wants to follow a process
other than relay succession.
Given the progression of authority in relay succession, we expect that the board’s
promotion of the President or COO into the CEO position will be an indicator that the
firm is following the standard relay succession model. They will therefore be less likely
to simultaneously appoint this person into the Chair position. We, therefore, hypothesize:
H3: CEO successors are less likely to be simultaneously appointed as Chair
when promoted from the President or COO position than if not promoted
from these positions.
Successor Origin
Firms often hire outside CEOs as a response to poor performance and to signal the
need for change (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Davidson, Nemec, Worrell, & Lin, 2002;
Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers & Owers, 1989; Wiersema, 1992). An outside successor
charged by the board to instigate change may feel the need for increased authority to
overcome resistance from insiders and to undertake the needed changes. Shen and
Cannella (2002) argue that outside executives lack the internal social networks and
coalitions that an insider would have and that outside CEO successions can create hostile
attitudes from insiders toward the new CEO. The outside CEO may recognize the
potential for hostility and believe that to be successful greater authority may be
necessary. So the outside CEO candidate may bargain for the additional title of Chair.
In addition, outsiders may bargain for control and argue that to make changes they
need unambiguous authority. Presumably the outsider already has current employment
and may, therefore, be in a position to negotiate multiple titles and the increased authority
14

that the titles convey3. There may also be a limited pool of acceptable outside
candidates. Elsaid, Davidson, and Wang (2008) show that when companies hire outside
CEOs, nearly half of the outsiders are already CEO at another firm. So, there is only a
limited pool of candidates with the requisite leadership experience, and some companies
may also desire an outside candidate with industry experience making the pool of
potential candidates even smaller. These factors may increase the bargaining power of
the outside successor who may desire the dual role. An inside candidate, on the other
hand, as designated heir may have already given-up bargaining power by being an
insider. Since the insider has already agreed to be the designated heir, the board may
believe the insider is unlikely to turn-down the CEO position. This lessens the insider’s
bargaining power. We, therefore, hypothesize:
H4: When an outside CEO is hired, boards will be more likely to simultaneously
appoint a CEO successor who is also the chair of the board than when an
insider is hired.

Executive Age
Brickley (2003) has argued that successor age may be an important determinant of
CEO selection. Age may confer experience. That is, an older executive may give the
appearance of having greater experience and depth of managerial talent. Colley, Doyle,
Logan, and Stettinius (2003) argue that successor age as well as successor experience are
two key variables utilized by boards in making succession decision. Boards do not
generally hire CEOs who are younger than age 40 or executives that are too close to the
company’ expected retirement age.
Successor age may also play a role in board decisions to appoint a CEO
simultaneously as board Chair. Boards may be more willing to appoint one person into a
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dual position without the person first serving a CEO apprenticeship when the executive is
older. Appointing a dual executive who is older may deflect criticism since the board can
argue that the executive has the requisite experience simply by virtue of being older and,
therefore, more experienced. As suggested by Ocasio (1999), boards are able to justify
their decisions as being consistent with their fiduciary responsibility when they follow
normal succession rules (e.g. relay succession). To appoint an executive directly into a
dual position may be seen as inconsistent with the internal succession progression of the
CEO appointment followed by the dual appointment as CEO/chair and, therefore,
inconsistent with the board members’ fiduciary responsibility. In satisfying their
fiduciary responsibility, board members may feel more comfortable and may justify the
decision with an appointment of a dual executive who is older and may possess greater
experience and depth of talent. We therefore hypothesize:
H5: Executives simultaneously appointed as CEO and Chair will be older than
executives appointed only as CEO.

An alternative hypothesis is drawn from Daily and Dalton (1997). They provide
evidence that the dual executives in their sample display less total tenure with their firms
than executives holding non-dual titles.

METHODOLOGY
Sample Selection
The ExecuComp data base lists the year of CEO succession. For the years 1992
through 1999 we use this data base to determine the year in which companies appoint
new CEOs. From this list we found 1017 CEO successions. To be included in our study,
we need to obtain information about the predecessor and successor CEOs. We obtain this
16

additional information from company proxy statements and from news announcements in
the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and the Lexis Nexis data base. Using these
sources we first determined if the succession actually took place, and then we extracted
information about the executives.
Our sample only includes CEO successions. Some of these successions were
simultaneous appointments into both the CEO and Chair positions. We did not include
promotions from CEO to Chair or CEO to both CEO and Chair positions. Thus, our
sample companies that appoint a dual executive are not following the typical pattern of
promotions that occur in relay succession. We were able to obtain complete information
on 745 of the succession announcements. These companies are our final sample. As
shown in Table I, 31% of our sample successions are dual appointments. Since
ExecuComp contains information for the S&P 1500, our study is somewhat biased toward
larger companies.
-----Insert Table I About Here-----

Description of Variables
Prior Firm Performance
We measure prior firm performance with the average return on assets (ROA), for the four
years before the succession. We obtain the ROAs from COMPUSTAT by dividing net
income by total year-end assets. As discussed in Barber and Lyon (1996), it is
appropriate to adjust for industry effects so that the profit measure is not just reflecting
industry activity. Following a similar procedure to Barber and Lyon, we subtract the
industry median ROA from the company ROA. The industry median ROA is the median
ROA of all companies on COMPUSTAT with the same 2 digit SIC code. For
17

comparative purposes, we also include the industry adjusted ROA for the four years
following the succession in our descriptive statistics.
Firing of Predecessor
Hatfield, Worrell, Davidson, and Bland (1999) argue that it is difficult to
determine whether a CEO has been fired. To solve this problem, they use only
successions in which company news releases specifically state that the CEO has been
fired. As they indicate, this procedure may miss some firings. It is not uncommon, for
example, when a firing takes place, for the board to allow the executive to “save-face”
and the executive “resigns” to pursue other interests.
To solve this problem, we examine several variables that help us to determine if
CEOs have been fired. First we determine the predecessors’ ages. Older CEOs are more
likely to retire and therefore, less likely to have been fired. Second, if the former CEO
remains as board chair, the executive is less likely to have been fired. We define this
variable as 1 if the predecessor CEO remains as board Chair and 0 otherwise. Third,
when the news announcement states that the predecessor has taken a position with
another company or organization, then it is likely that the turnover has been initiated by
the executive and not by the board. We define this variable to be 1 if the predecessor
resigns for a new position and 0 otherwise.
To include all of these firing-related variables in a multivariate model would be
problematic because there is considerable correlation among them; each variable is
theoretically linked to the firing decision. One method of variable reduction is to
combine the variables with a factor analysis. In this way, the portion of the variability
explained by each of the individual variables is included in a combined variable called
the factor loading (Berenson, Levine, and Goldstein, 1983). The factor model creates a
18

factor loading through the variance-covariance matrix. The factor loading is then used as
a single variable instead of the larger number of individual variables. Since each of the
three primary variables has been constructed so that a larger value (e.g. older age, a value
of 1 if the predecessor remains as Chair, and a value of 1 if the predecessor takes a new
position) implies that a firing is less likely, the factor loading has a similar interpretation.
That is when the factor loading is large, it is less likely that the predecessor has been
fired.
Successor Age
From the proxies and the news releases, we determine the successor’s age at the
time of the succession. Age is used as a proxy for the experience of the new CEO. As
shown in Table I, the average successor is about 52 years old when appointed CEO.
Successor Origin
From the proxy statements and the news releases, we determined the number of
years that the successor had been with the company. For our tests, we define an outsider
as a successor with no previous work experience with the company. Some executives are
hired from the outside for a short period and then promoted to CEO. As such, if a CEO
has been with a company for a very short period of time, would this executive be an
insider or are they an outsider (Kesner & Sebora, 1994)? Therefore, we also defined
outsiders as executives with company tenure of two years or less. Since this alternate
designation did not qualitatively change our results, we define outsiders as those with no
prior company experience for the remainder of the paper. As shown in Table I, about
one-third of the successors are outsiders.
Heir Apparent
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We designate a relay succession to be one in which the President or COO
becomes the successor CEO, and therefore could have been considered the heir apparent.
To identify these firms that appear to be following relay succession practices, we
compare the names of all newly appointed CEO’s to the names of the President and COO
in year t-1, as in Davidson, Nemec, and Worrell (2001). As shown in Table I, 45% of our
sample successors held one or both of these titles prior to being promoted or appointed to
CEO or CEO and Chair. Alternately, it would be better to determine if each company
had a formal succession plan in place. We searched proxy statements and news releases
and found virtually no announcements of adoptions of formal succession plans
particularly for the earlier years in our sample period. We, therefore, use the indicator of
relay succession as given above.

RESULTS
Univariate Comparisons
Table I shows univariate comparisons of our test variables. In our sample 229
firms simultaneously appointed the new CEO as the board Chair and 516 appointed the
executive as only CEO. The average industry adjusted ROA is 2.12% in the four years
prior for both dual successions and non-dual successions. The lack of a significant
difference does not support H1. The factor loading for predecessor firing is 0.85 for
duality successions and is 0.97 otherwise. The difference is significant at the 0.001 level
(t = 6.06). While the actual values of the factor loadings are difficult to interpret, recall
that larger factor loadings suggest that firing is less likely and smaller values suggest
firing to have been more likely. Since the factor loading for the duality successions is
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significantly smaller than for the non-duality successions, the results support H2. When a
predecessor has been fired, the board is more likely to appoint a dual successor.
In our sample slightly less than 35% of the successors were previously designated
heir apparent for duality appointments, but about 49% were designated heirs in the nondual appointments. This difference is significant at the 0.001 level (t = 3.71) and is
consistent with H3. We find that 39% of the dual appointments, but only 29% of the nondual appointments, are outside executives. This difference is significant at the 0.001
level (t =-2.82), and this result is consistent with H4.
Executives who are simultaneously appointed as CEO and Chair are older than
those appointed only as CEO. The average age of executives appointed into dual
positions is 54.1 years while the non-dual executives’ average age is only 50.5 years.
The difference is significant at the 0.001 level (t = −6.31) and supports H5. We also find
that companies with dual appointments are significantly larger than those companies with
non-dual appointments, and we therefore include firm size as a control variable in our
analyses.
Correlations and Logit Regression Analysis
Table II contains a correlation matrix for our variables. There are a number of
variables that have statistically significant correlations. As a result, we present our
regressions first as single variable regressions and then in a multivariate format. This
approach lets us see the potential effects of multicollinearity, if any.
-----Insert Table II about Here----Table III displays the logit regression results. The dependent variable in the logit
regressions is a binary variable taking the value of 1 when the board appoints the
successor to a dual position and is 0 when it is only a CEO appointment. Since the
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dependent variable is a binary variable, we employ logit regressions. Because several of
the explanatory variables are correlated, we first report simple single variable logit
regressions with each independent variable, in order to avoid the potential problem of
multi-collinearity. The single variable logit regressions are numbered 1-6.
-----Insert Table III About Here----In regression 1, the estimated coefficient for the industry adjusted ROAt-1 to t-4 is
statistically insignificant. As in the univariate tests, this result is inconsistent with H1.
The estimated coefficient for the predecessor firing variable in regression 2 is negative as
predicted by H2, and is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The estimated
coefficient for the new CEO’s age in regression 3 is positive and significant at the 0.001
level and supports the predictions of H5. In regression 4, the estimated coefficient for
CEO origin (being an outsider) variable is positive and significant at the 0.001 level. This
result is consistent with the predictions of H4. The estimated coefficient for the heirapparent binary variable in regression 5 is negative and significant at the 0.001 level
supporting the predictions of H3. In regression 6 the estimated coefficient for firm size is
positive and significant at the 0.001 level, indicating that larger firms are more likely to
make dual appointments.
Regressions 7-10 in Table III are multiple variable logit regressions. The signs
and statistical significance of all of the independent variables, except new CEO outsider
and new CEO designated heir, remain similar to the results found in the simple
regressions. Regression 7 includes all explanatory and control variables for our sample.
The estimated coefficient for new CEO outsider is statistically insignificant. The loss of
significance suggests that there may be multi-collinearity with other variables. Referring
back to Table II, new CEO outsider is significantly correlated with the firing variable.
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When the predecessor has been fired, it is more likely that an outsider is hired. In
addition, the successor origin variable is also highly correlated (at the 0.001 level) with
the heir-apparent variable since none of the outsiders would have been heir apparent. To
correct for the possibility of multi-collinearity, we drop the CEO origin variable. This
yields a negative coefficient of greater significance for the heir apparent variable
(regression 8).

Robustness Tests
In our sample, 39 CEO appointments occurred for individuals that were either
board Chair, Vice-Chair, or former Chair. Since this is a different type of appointment,
we re-estimate our regressions, but we delete these 39 cases. The signs and statistical
significance levels of our coefficients remain unchanged, and therefore are not reported.
A further concern is that we may not have adjusted for the past succession
practices of each firm in our sample. It is possible that some firms simply always prefer
to have a dual leader while other firms do not, regardless of their current situation. We
therefore incorporate data on whether the previous CEO was in a dual position before
each new CEO appointment. We find that in 499 (67%) out of our 745 firms, the
previous CEO was also the board chair. However, of firms that made a dual appointment
for their new CEO, only 58% also had the old CEO in a dual position. This is compared
to 71% of non-dual CEO appointments where the old CEO occupied both positions (with
the difference significant in t-tests at the 0.001% level). In our regression tests, an
indicator for the duality of the old CEO takes a significant negative coefficient in all
models, but does not change the signs or significance levels of the other variables, and is
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therefore not reported. Overall, this means that firms were the old CEO was in both
positions were significantly less likely to make a dual appointment for their new CEO.
An alternative means of examining a firm’s past succession practices is to isolate
those firms in our sample that experience multiple CEO successions over the sample
period. This yields 109 firms (207 observations) that make more than 1 CEO
appointment. Compared to firms that make only a single CEO appointment, these firms
are more likely to make dual appointments (42% versus 27%, which is significant at
0.05% in t-tests). This is also consistent with the argument that firms going through
extended periods of uncertainty, proxied for by this measure of CEO turnover, are more
likely to opt for a dual appointment. In regression #10, when we include a variable equal
to 1 if the lagged appointment was to both CEO and chair positions, and equal to zero
otherwise, it is significant at the 0.01 level (chi square = 8.15) in our regression model,
while the signs and significance levels of the other variables remain unchanged. This
indicates that past CEO succession practices have some influence on the chance of a new
CEO being appointed to both CEO and chair positions, although they do not explain all
of the variation. The increase in the R2 of a model including the lagged duality indicator
suggests that this variable adds about 9% to the explanatory power of our model.

CONCLUSIONS
Duality occurs when one person holds both of a firm’s two top executive
positions, CEO and Chair. This leadership structure is very common in U.S. firms and
generally occurs in the relay succession process in which the CEO is promoted to
CEO/Chair (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997). Our contribution to the literature is that
we examine an alternative, the instances in which companies hire a person directly into
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the CEO/Chair position. We therefore build upon studies that examine the characteristics
of firms employing a dual leadership structure (Faleye, 2007), by focusing on when the
CEO succession process gives rise to duality. Ocasio (1999) describes how informal
rules guide corporate behavior in general, but more specifically how succession rules
guide CEO succession decisions. The type of succession leading to duality that we
investigate is not as common as the relay succession process, and may, therefore, occur
outside the traditional succession rules.
We show that when there has been organizational stress that creates the need for a
new leader, boards will often appoint an executive directly into a dual position. This
suggests that the organizational structure needs of a company may be situationally
dependent. Boards may not, in some situations, be able to wait for a CEO to gain
experience before promoting the CEO into the dual positions. In particular, when a
company fires the former CEO, the board may perceive that an unambiguous leader is
needed. In these cases, boards are more likely to directly appoint the successor into the
dual positions. We also show that when boards appoint a dual executive, fewer of them
have been designated as heir apparent. This may be partially explained by the fact that
many of the dual appointees are outsiders, but also by the fact that boards may not want
to appoint an heir into a dual position before the heir has served their complete
apprenticeship. In addition, when boards appoint an outside successor, the successor is
more likely to be appointed as both CEO and Chair.
Boards must meet their fiduciary responsibility. Appointing someone
simultaneously as both CEO and Chair could bring accusations that the executive is not
ready for both mantels. Our results show that the average successor age of the dual
executive appointments is greater by nearly three years than for those appointed only as
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CEO. This may give justification to the board decision since the older executive would
have more experience.
Overall, our results are consistent with dual appointments being made when a
firm needs a strong and unambiguous leader. We do not find evidence that dual
appointments influence the firm’s short-term performance. It is therefore unclear if
proposals to limit dual appointments would be in the best interest of shareholders,
because our research indicates that it is not agency conflicts, ex ante, that are driving the
dual appointment decision. Instead, our findings are consistent with dual appointments
being made to optimally contract with a new manager at a time when the firm is subject
to increased stress and uncertainty.
Our study suffers from the following limitations. First, our sample comes from
the Execucomp database. This database covers relatively large companies and those that
receive considerable scrutiny from financial analysts. Our results may, therefore, not be
applicable to smaller firms. Second, we do not have access to the actual decision process
and discussions that occur in boards and lead to the hiring of one person into a dual role.
Perhaps with other methodologies, future research could be directed toward this issue.
Finally, we define organizational stress as the firing of a predecessor and poor financial
performance and hypothesize that this stress creates the need for an unambiguous leader.
There may be other factors that create this need. For example, there may be certain
industry situations and opportunities that create this need. Or, there may be internal
situations within the firm that are not readily apparent to outside observers and
researchers that create this need. Other research methodologies may be able to address
these issues as well.
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ENDNOTES
1

It is interesting to note that when there has been poor prior performance and the board
hires an outside CEO, the stock market reacts positively (Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers, and
Owers, 1989). So the market reacts positively when succession rules are followed (Shen
and Canella, 2003) and when the situation requires succession rules to be ignored and the
board ignores them (Lubatkin et al, 1989).

2

This alternative perspective on duality has its roots in stewardship theory. Under
stewardship theory, executives are motivated to act in the best interests of a company’s
stakeholders, including stockholders.

3

There is considerable anecdotal evidence supporting the proposition that outsiders have
increased bargaining positions. Having viewed numerous dean and department head
searches, we have observed that outsiders are more successful in bargaining for increased
departmental resources and lucrative contracts. The AACSB salary surveys always show
that newly hired full professors make more, on average, than full professors, in general.
In the sports world, we observe this as well. For example, Bill Parcels left the Patriots, a
successful franchise, to join the Jets so that he could be not only head coach but also
general manager.
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics for Dual Versus Non-dual Successions
The table presents average figures for our sample of 745 CEO successions, with standard deviations given in
parentheses. All figures are measured during the year of CEO succession, which occurs between 1992 and 1999,
except total assets, which are as of year t-1, and industry-adjusted ROA, which is the average over years 1 to 4. ***
indicates p ≤ 0.001.

_____________________________________________________________________
Full Sample

Dual
Appointments

Non-dual
Appointments

t-statistic

1.

Dual Succession
Indicator

30.74%
(46.17%)

N=229

N=516

2.

Industry Adjusted
ROA t-1 to t-4

2.12%
(9.21)

2.12
(8.14)

2.12
(9.65)

-0.00

3.

Industry Adjusted
ROA t+1 to t+4

1.23%
(14.96)

0.87
(13.32)

1.38
(15.63)

0.46

4.

Old CEO Not Fireda

0.93
(0.25)

0.85
(0.36)

0.97
(0.18)

6.06***

5.

New CEO Age

51.58
(6.94)

54.12
(7.74)

50.45
(6.24)

-6.31***

6.

New CEO Outsider

32.08%
(46.71)

39.30%
(48.95)

28.87%
(45.36)

-2.82***

7.

New CEO Designated
Heir

44.56%
(49.74)

34.50%
(47.64)

49.03%
(50.04)

3.71***

8.

Total Assetsb
($000,000’s)

4,082.67
(13,631.83)

6,589.09
(16,795.13)

3,006.75
(7,802.63)

-3.26***

_____________________________________________________________________________
a

To measure CEO firing, we combined three variables utilizing a factor analysis. The three variables are
predecessor CEO age, predecessor CEO board Chair status (1=yes, 0=no), and predecessor CEO new job status
(1=yes, 0=no). The variable is the factor loadings from the three variables. A large value suggests firing is less
likely while a low value suggests firing is likely.
b
We show the dollar value of total assets in this table, but use the log of assets in the statistical tests in this table and
in the subsequent tables.
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Table II: Correlation Matrix of Variables
This table present correlation coefficients for the variables in our sample of 745 CEO successions over the period from 1992 to 1999.
indicates p ≤ 0.01, and * indicates p ≤ 0.05.
2

Industry Adjusted ROA t-1 to t-4

0.00012

1.00

3.

Industry Adjusted ROA t+1 to t+4

-0.01590

0.57740***

1.00

4.

Old CEO Not Fireda

-0.21710***

-0.00488

0.00528

1.00

5.

New CEO Age

0.24366***

-0.02508

0.02290

-0.09612***

1.00

6.

New CEO Outsider

0.10305***

-0.03759

-0.02661

-0.11644***

0.07352*

1.00

7.

New CEO Designated Heir

-0.13491***

0.02389

0.02025

0.20321***

-0.08438*

-0.45420***

1.00

8.

Ln (Total Assets)

0.09577***

0.01155

0.07950*

0.06588

0.11320***

-0.00895

0.26021***

Dual Succession Indicator

2.

a

4

5

6

indicates p ≤ 0.001, **

1
1.00

1.

3

***

7

8

1.00

To measure CEO firing, we combined three variables utilizing a factor analysis. The three variables are predecessor CEO age, predecessor CEO board Chair
status (1=yes, 0=no), and predecessor CEO new job status (1=yes, 0=no). The variable is the factor loadings from the three variables. A large value suggests
firing is less likely while a low value suggests firing is likely.
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Table III: Logistic Regression Analysis
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regression models where the dependent variable is 1 if CEO appointment also includes appointment to
chair and is 0 otherwise in our sample of 745 CEO successions over the period from 1992 to 1999. Chi-squared statistics are given in parentheses. *** indicates
p ≤ 0.001, ** indicates p ≤ 0.01, and * indicates p ≤ 0.05.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Reg.

Constant

1

-0.8124***
(99.38)
0.7221*
(5.96)
-5.0057***
(56.38)
-0.9709***
(95.03)
-0.5615***
(30.11)
-1.4354***
(43.18)
-3.6742***
(22.75)
-3.6023***
(22.49)
-3.3768***
(20.26)
-4.5305***
(11.10)

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

IndustryAdjusted
ROA t-1 to t-4

Old CEO
_Not
Fireda_

New CEO’s
___Age___

New CEO
_Outsider_

New CEO
Designated
Heir

Ln(Assets)

Lagged
Duality
Indicator

99.38
(0.00)

0.00%
-1.6669***
(29.38)

5.90%
0.0802***
(41.04)

8.31%
0.4668***
(7.85)

1.46%
-0.6023***
(13.39)

0.00260
(0.06)
0.00247
(0.06)
0.00201
(0.04)
0.000692
(0.00)

___R2___

-1.5142***
(20.34)
-1.5201***
(20.55)
-1.4557***
(19.80)
-1.2658*
(5.23)

0.0711***
(29.48)
0.0711***
(29.49)
0.0758***
(34.45)
0.0884***
(13.53)

0.1297
(0.41)

0.1974
(0.99)
-0.2284
(0.43)

-0.4605*
(5.23)
-0.5204***
(8.49)
-0.2896
(2.20)
-1.0585**
(6.92)

2.58%
0.0959***
(9.98)
0.1062***
(11.08)
0.1075***
(11.50)

2.19%
16.09%
16.02%
13.96%

0.1199*
(4.76)

0.9676**
(8.14)

25.81%

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a
To measure CEO firing, we combined three variables utilizing a factor analysis. The three variables are predecessor CEO age, predecessor CEO board Chair
status (1=yes, 0=no), and predecessor CEO new job status (1=yes, 0=no). The variable is the factor loadings from the three variables. A large value suggests
firing is less likely while a low value suggests firing is likely.
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